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A B S T R A C T   
Colombia’s peace process prioritised conflict-torn geographies ostensibly suffering from historical state absence. 
We examine the origins and afterlives of this ’territorial’ peace using discourse analysis, archival research and 
field interviews. The state-initiated agenda exceeded the objective of structuring negotiations with FARC guer-
rillas, pointing to the transformative potential of social dialogue. The negotiating parties co-sponsored partici-
patory rural development forums, which attracted numerous collectives. These diverse actors’ visionary 
proposals to address neglected claims and conflicts influenced the government’s and FARC’s respective dis-
courses, ultimately informing the 2016 peace agreement. Yet, state priorities for peace centred on international 
legitimation and post-conflict infrastructure development to accelerate foreign investment in export-oriented 
mining, oil extraction, and agri-business. The beleaguered FARC challenged government’s narratives while 
struggling to rebuild organisational legitimacy and prevent fragmentation. Subsequent disappointments with 
fraught territorial development plans, a new government’s securitization of peace programmes, and continuing 
violence mar the post-agreement period. Prior contributors to participatory forums have joined contentious 
actions against neglectful austerity, extractivist maldevelopment and targeted assassinations. Thus, we argue that 
Colombia’s international lessons may reside less in governmental pacification programmes - the potential of 
state-sponsored participatory dialogues notwithstanding - than in resilient (post-)conflict communities open to 
exercising their peace imagination while remaining mobilised against new-and-old violences. Furthermore, the 
territorial peace saga illustrates productive overlaps between critical peace geographies and socio-territorial 
analysis - especially the territorial restructuring induced by neoliberal economic policies, the violent multiple 
territorialities of differentiated state presence in geographical peripheries and pluriversal struggles against 
ontological occupation addressed herein.   
1. Introduction 
Once the object of international expectation and local hopes, 
Colombia’s peace process risks derailment. Only a few years have passed 
since the 2016 landmark peace agreement between the government and 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which earned 
President Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2018) the Nobel Peace Prize for 
innovative efforts toward building lasting peace. Yet confidence in the 
agreement’s balance between security and socioeconomic reform has 
waned, as has Colombia’s exemplary role to “help find solutions in other 
parts of the world with similar or worse problems” (Santos, 2017: 11). 
International observers who validated the robust program now raise 
concerns over complications and delays to implementation (Kroc Insti-
tute, 2018, 2019). Moreover, the electoral tidal shift of 2018 ushered in 
contentious post-agreement politics with a hardened state focus on se-
curity. Continued violence blights post-conflict territories: in the first 
three months of 2020 alone, 71 social leaders and 20 FARC ex- 
combatants were assassinated (El Tiempo, 2020). Research on 
everyday life in post-conflict settings draws attention to multiple orders 
of enduring violence (O’Bryen, 2019; Ojeda, 2013). Garcia-Villegas 
et al. (2016: 10) deem the agreement’s initial years “crucial for both 
avoiding a return to conflict and transcending it permanently,” but even 
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the most innovative legislation and government programmes have failed 
to improve the lives of Colombia’s disadvantaged, often due to inade-
quate or flawed implementation (see Oslender’s arguments in Cairo 
et al., 2018). Indeed, the agreement may fatefully join a long list of failed 
ceasefires interspersed with resurgent conflict over the last five decades. 
Even some FARC leaders, including former chief negotiator Ivan 
Márquez, have renounced the process and called for rearmament.1 
This paper focuses on the ‘territorial peace’ pillar of the ambitious 
peace process and its post-agreement disappointments. The Colombian 
government ostensibly sought to transcend the standardised and much- 
critiqued ‘liberal peace’ framework by delivering an internationally 
exemplary program with geographic ‘differentiation’ and socially 
transversal transformations, thereby benefiting the people and terri-
tories most affected by conflict (see Koopman in Cairo et al., 2018). 
However, they took few effective steps to overcome the assumption that 
“democracy and economic development create peace” (Brauchler and 
Naucke, 2017: 422), and the project exhibited built-in limitations from 
its inception. From a geo-political economy perspective, delivering im-
provements to conflict-torn regions was subsidiary to a globalist 
neoliberal economic development strategy, to be achieved through 
increased access to international capital and supply chains. The gov-
ernment’s priority was thus re-designing erstwhile disputed and inac-
cessible geographies: peace would help Colombia gain international 
recognition and render pacified hinterlands investment-ready through 
infrastructure provision. Entrepreneurial projects would facilitate the 
expansion of agribusiness and extractive industries including mining. 
Meanwhile, our analysis of the contested negotiations illustrates the 
FARC’s opposition to this agenda, as negotiators sought to rebuild 
organizational legitimacy by engaging in consensus-building and open 
participatory dialogue, simultaneously leveraging the process to 
advance alternative explanations of the conflict’s root causes and the 
necessary steps to transcend them. 
For historically side-lined collectives, such as Afro-Colombians, 
indigenous peoples and campesinos, the participatory forums co- 
sponsored by the negotiating parties as part of the peace process 
meant a space to assert alternative territorial visions, which influenced 
both governmental and FARC discourse. Moreover, in the face of post- 
agreement disillusionment, and the new government’s lack of commit-
ment to a long-term peacebuilding process rooted in people’s everyday 
lives and “situated knowledges within different cultural settings” (Wil-
liams et al., 2014: 22), many of these collectives engage in more explicit 
contentious politics and social protest. Responding to the incumbent 
administration’s emphasis on peace-as-security and legality, instead of 
peace for social and territorial justice (Richmond, 2006), and the 
intensification of extractivist maldevelopment (Escobar, 2018; Svampa, 
2019), these collectives continue to resist the threats of environmental 
collapse and destruction of their diverse ways of life and livelihoods 
through asserting multiple territorial ontologies. 
Our methodology for delineating the origin and contested resignifi-
cation of territorial peace centres on close reading of archival docu-
ments,2 supplemented with secondary sources and field interviews 
collected since the agreement. The paper begins with a brief timeline of 
peace negotiations and the key elements of the Santos government’s 
territorial peace discourse, which gradually replaced the 
administration’s earlier rhetoric of economic prosperity while retaining 
an international orientation (Section 2). We then analyse how contes-
tation from FARC negotiators and input from civil society inscribed new 
meanings and potentials into territorial peace discussions along four key 
analytical dimensions: rural land and natural resources; the historical 
geography of uneven development and differentiated state presence; 
local-level participatory approaches; and alternative visions of territo-
rial well-being (Section 3). In the next section, we examine the agree-
ment’s implementation and post-agreement threats to peace. 
Specifically, we review the fraught Territorially Focused Development 
Plans (Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial or PDETs) scheme 
and critique the resignification of peace under the current government 
administration (Section 4). In the concluding section, we reflect on 
lessons for international peace-making practices and the critical geog-
raphies of peace, which we believe could be enriched by emerging Latin 
American perspectives on the analytical value of territory. We specif-
ically highlight the possibility of further dialogue between geographical 
approaches to peace and work on the geo-political economy of 
neoliberalization-induced territorial restructuring; the violent multiple 
territorialities of differentiated state presence in peripheral regions; and 
the varied dialogue-and-contention repertories of those struggling for a 
‘pluriverse’, wherein multiple territories of life may co-exist (Escobar, 
2018). If geographies of peace is to incorporate multiple perspectives – 
to become a “deliberately broad umbrella” (Williams et al., 2014: 27) – it 
is imperative from them to consider the contributions of socio-territorial 
analysis to crtiquing state-led pacification schemes, and the actual ter-
ritorial struggles of people striving for peace in Colombia and beyond. 
2. Tracing the territorial dividend of peace 
The peace process has passed through three stages, which together 
constitute the genesis, contested evolution and fraught implementation 
of the peace agreement’s territorial provisions. The first stage 
(2010–2012) consisted of secret negotiations initiated at the outset of 
the Santos administration, whereby the parties agreed on a negotiation 
agenda with the overarching aim of ending armed conflict between the 
FARC and the Colombian government. This coincided with the gov-
ernment’s roll-out of ambitious countrywide economic programmes, 
with evident transnational designs for post-conflict territories. The sec-
ond stage comprised the main, open negotiations in Havana, Cuba, 
resulting in a general agreement in September 2016. Formally intro-
duced in 2012, the territorial peace construct helped to structure 
contentious negotiations, but underwent resignification in the process.3 
The third, current stage began with the 2016 national referendum, 
whereby voters narrowly rejected the agreement,4 signalling the prev-
alence of significant anti-FARC sentiment fanned by the vocal opposition 
of former President Álvaro Uribe.5 Though a revised final agreement was 
eventually ratified in parliament, opposition to the peace process was 
compounded by the election of President Ivan Duque, Uribe’s close ally, 
in May 2018. 
Peace promised a lucrative dividend at the beginning of negotiations. 
President Uribe’s (2002–2010) ‘democratic security’ policy had centred 
1 On 29 August 2019, Ivan Marquez released a video statement alongside 
other senior FARC members, including Jesus Santrich and ‘El Paisa’, 
denouncing the peace process and calling for a return to arms.  
2 We draw primarily on two sources: (1) the Biblioteca del Proceso de Paz 
(Peace Process Library), an archive of 11 volumes held in the National Archive 
of Colombia, containing records of seven years of exploratory and public dis-
cussions between the FARC and the Colombian government; and (2) a digital 
archive held by United Nations Colombia and the Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia (UN and UNC, 2012a, 2012b), on the Agrarian Development Forum 
and other participatory dialogues. All translations are our own. 
3 Though 2012 signalled the first explicit reference to territorial peace, its 
origins can be traced to former President Uribe’s administration, when Santos 
served as Minister of Defence and Jaramillo as Vice Minister for human rights 
and international issues. During this period (2006–2009), Jaramillo designed 
the Plan for Comprehensive Territorial Consolidation for the Macarena region 
(Plan de Consolidación Integral Territorial de la Macarena), a regional interven-
tion strategy which sought not only to eliminate the presence of insurgents, but 
to “bring the state closer to communities” (Rodríguez 2019: 176).  
4 In the plebiscite, 50.2% voted against the agreement and 49% in favour, 
based on 37% of eligible voters casting a ballot.  
5 According to a newspaper report published soon after the result, only 22% 
of Colombians would accept the FARC in politics (Semana, 2016). 
J.M. Diaz et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Geoforum 118 (2021) 106–116
108
on aggressive actions and, underwritten by US-sponsored Plan Colombia, 
left the FARC militarily weakened and ideologically isolated, though not 
defeated (Ojeda, 2013: 760). In 2010, newly instated President Santos 
faced pressures and incentives to “normalize” the country by ending the 
conflict altogether and eradicating violence (Hylton and Tauss, 2016: 
254). The expansion of extractive industries into erstwhile inaccessible 
unproductive zones promised a significant boost to economic growth, 
paralleling the extractivist approach applied throughout Latin America 
and enabled by the investment capital made available to much of the 
global South by a regime of infrastructure-led development (Schindler 
and Kanai, 2019). But accessing international markets through free 
trade agreements and luring foreign investment required assurances that 
the rule of law – property rights in particular – would be guaranteed 
(Hylton and Tauss, 2016). Santos’ inaugural speech framed his eco-
nomic strategy by replacing “security” with “prosperity”. He developed 
the program in his proposal for “locomotives” to drive the march to-
wards progress for the “entire country”, including FARC-controlled 
areas. Priorities included infrastructure (roadways and ports), the 
countryside (agribusiness and mega plantations) and mining and oil 
exploration (Biblioteca del Proceso de Paz, (henceforth BPP), 2018, 
Vol.1: 134; 137). The expansionist rural agenda manifested in the cre-
ation of ZIDRES (Zones of Interest for Economic and Social Rural 
Development), intended to facilitate large-scale export-oriented devel-
opment in remote underexploited regions (Camargo, 2017). Thus, 
beyond the value of peace per se, pacification (as in neutralising the risk 
of FARC attacks on lucrative economic activities and costly in-
frastructures) would leverage growth. In fact, the ZIDRES project was 
pursued in conjunction with large national public investment in build-
ing, upgrading and extending road networks to serve erstwhile remote, 
conflict-ridden geographies and “generate both peace and prosperity” 
(Zeiderman, 2019: 11). 
The state’s territorial peace framework evolved as Santos’ govern-
ment attempted to avoid past negotiation failures6, and pursue a 
comprehensive yet geographically tailored approach to peacebuilding, 
while setting red lines on major economic and political reforms. How-
ever, trust between the FARC and government was at an all-time low 
(BPP, 2018, Vol. 1: 60), and initial discussions stalled on disagreements 
regarding the nature and scale of required transformation. This discord 
persisted throughout negotiations, particularly as the country’s under-
lying economic model lay at the heart of FARC’s raison d’être. Disap-
pointed by sluggish talks, Santos threatened to halt the process (Ibid, 
Vol. 2: 190); for their part, FARC argued that previous failed attempts 
had resulted from governmental reluctance to address the conflict’s true 
causes, not to their unwillingness to negotiate (Ibid, Vol. 2: 59–60). 
Against this backdrop, government negotiators introduced territorial 
peace to bridge seemingly irreconcilable interpretations, drawing on 
Jonathan Powell’s notion of compatible narratives (Ibid, Vol. 1: 214). 
Powell, chief UK negotiator for the Good Friday Agreement and one of 
Santos’ high-profile international advisors, argued that it was possible 
for each party to hold divergent interpretations of underlying problems 
and necessary solutions, provided there was agreement on ending con-
flict as the common objective. Thus, territorial peace became crucial for 
establishing communication channels that both parties could trust. 
Territorial peace was elaborated through state discourse, particu-
larly in speeches7 by Sergio Jaramillo, High Commissioner for Peace 
(2012–16) and the construct’s lead architect. Though never fully sys-
tematized, we identify several overlapping core dimensions, all of which 
point to a significant shift in state-citizen relations. These include a focus 
on peripheral regions most affected by the conflict; the expansion of the 
public sphere; strengthening the institutional presence of the Colombian 
state; the provision of “territorial justice”, incorporating victims as 
active agents in peace-building; and strengthening democratic partici-
pation both during and after negotiations. It was the explicit enfoque 
territorial which provided the impetus for incorporating civil society 
organisations and the Colombian people more intimately in the process 
of peacebuilding, with Jaramillo claiming that “territorial peace would 
be impossible without massive citizen participation” (BPP, 2018, Vol. 3: 
231). This discourse of open dialogue and participation garnered sig-
nificant praise among international monitors and scholars alike. In a 
brief commentary, however, Colombian sociologist Arturo Escobar drew 
attention to what he perceived as an inherent limit to the transformative 
potential of these participatory elements, warning that “a more lasting 
territorial peace would have to begin by being consulted with the pop-
ulation” (Salgar, 2017, emphasis added), a critique which seems partic-
ularly prescient considering subsequent disjunctures. 
3. Contested resignification 
This section analyses FARC negotiators’ contestation of the state’s 
territorial peace discourse. Fundamental differences concerned explan-
atory narratives on the conflict’s origin and proposed policies to over-
come it. Specifically, we present and review two fundamental areas of 
retrospective contention, (1) the (mal)distribution of rural land and 
natural resources, and (2) geographically uneven development and 
differentiated state presence; and two areas of prospective reshaping, (3) 
(dis)continuities between civil society peace practices and the state 
agenda for political participation, and (4) alternatives to the hegemonic 
imagination of economically mainstreamed post-conflict territories. 
The FARC’s decision to opt for a negotiated end to more than 50 
years of conflict requires consideration of their origins, ideological un-
derpinnings and prior experience with peace negotiations. Between 
1964 and 2016, the FARC were a political-military organisation allied to 
the Colombian Communist Party, with which they acted in close part-
nership until the early 1980s. Though they would later split in pursuit of 
more offensive military tactics (see Brittain, 2010: 25), their core 
rationale of todas las formas de lucha (all forms of struggle) had never 
precluded electoral politics. Indeed despite several failed attempts at a 
peace, and what can only be described as the political genocide of the 
Union Patriotica party8, FARC leader and founder Manuel Marulanda 
would continue to emphasise the value of political parties as tools for 
societal change (Marulanda, 2003: 120). Thus, as argued elsewhere (see 
Phelan, 2018), their transition to party - particularly one engaging in 
local politics - was consistent with their revolutionary aims. One nego-
tiator affirmed: “FARC’s goal of the profound transformation of 
Colombian society remains intact and continues. What we are looking 
for is to take a less painful route” (Colectivo Viktoria, 2016).9 This 
promise of continuity with their ideals – including the opportunity to 
resolve the ‘land question’ - was central to their willingness to engage in 
peace talks. 
6 El Caguan process (1999–2002), the most recent peace attempt, had ended 
bogged down in procedural issues, arguably providing much of the impetus for 
Uribe’s pursuit of all-out military victory (Herbolzheimer, 2016: 2).  
7 It is noteworthy that many of these speeches were given in English to high- 
profile forums at Harvard, Oxford and the University of Chicago, thereby laying 
the groundwork for international legitimation. 
8 In 1985 the Unión Patriótica party was established as a result of peace ne-
gotiations under President Belisario Betancur, mainly constituted by FARC 
members and allies. While enjoying moderate electoral success, during the 
period 1985–1992 over 3500 members - including presidential candidates, 
governors and mayors - were massacred, leading to the FARC’s “understandable 
reluctance to exchange the gun for the ballot-box” (Hobsbawm, 2003: 381).  
9 A series of interviews with FARC negotiators, conducted in May 2016 in 
Havana, detailing their experiences and opinions regarding negotiations. The 
video was explicitly recommended as a source in conversation with FARC 
members during fieldwork in 2019. 
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3.1. Rural land and natural resources 
The ‘land question’ requires contextualisation. Despite being a 
middle-income country, around 36.1% of Colombia’s rural population 
live in poverty, double the rate of urban areas (16.2%) (Colombia Re-
ports, 2019). Land concentration among a few wealthy landowners 
helps explain the persistence and pervasiveness of this deprivation, with 
1.15% of the population owning 52.2% of the land (UNDP, 2011: 50). 
This maldistribution has deep-rooted historical origins, dating back to 
the colonial latifundio system wherein a small political and economic 
elite accumulated vast swathes of land. Successive land reforms 
throughout the twentieth century focused principally on freeing up 
nationally owned baldios (wastelands), yet failed to purchase or 
nationalise private property owing to strong opposition from elite in-
terests (Pearce, 1990; Ríos and Gago, 2018). Rural vulnerabilities were 
further exacerbated at the turn of the century by dramatic increases in 
coca cultivation, the rise of paramilitary groups, and the ongoing con-
flict with the guerrilla insurgency, leading to widespread displacement 
of rural campesino and indigenous communities. Together with the 
continual failure of legal institutions to adequately define and enforce 
property rights, this has meant that between 1980 and 2010, around 
434,100 families were forced to abandon, sell, or entrust 6,638,195 ha of 
land, of which only 495,493 have been recovered (UN and UNC, 2012b: 
74). 
The FARC first emerged as dispersed clusters of campesino self- 
defence groups opposing the ongoing dispossession and state- 
sponsored violence against rural populations unable to defend their 
land legally (Pearce, 1990). Despite later expansion into urban areas, 
FARC leadership has largely always consisted of people from rural 
backgrounds, with a “personal connection to the countryside” (Brittain, 
2010: 47). Their first political agenda, the 1964 Agrarian Programme of 
the FARC-EP Guerrillas, has remained largely consistent over time, cen-
tring on an eight-point Revolutionary Agrarian Policy envisaging a rural 
credit system, land titling, health and education, protection of indige-
nous groups, and ultimately to “change the social structure of Colom-
bia’s countryside” (Phelan, 2018; FARC-EP, 1964). Logically therefore, 
land reform was promised as cornerstone to territorial peace, as 
Márquez clarified: “[f]or the FARC, the concept of LAND is inextricably 
linked to territory; they are an indivisible whole that goes beyond the 
merely agricultural and touches on strategic and vital interests for the 
whole nation” (BPP, 2018, Vol. 2: 59, emphasis in original). 
Introducing a territorial perspective allowed FARC negotiators to 
engage with the question of what kind of land reform was being pro-
posed and what could be realistically achieved. The government initially 
appeared to be sympathetic to the need for significant change: Jar-
amillo’s (2013a: 3-4) early espousals of territorial peace included a 
massive programme of land distribution to reverse the causes of conflict. 
This was to be implemented as a form of “territorial justice”, whereby 
property redistribution to conflict victims would promote collective 
reparation, with “everything that has to be done to restore and protect 
property rights” (Jaramillo, 2013c: 6). The FARC were critical from the 
outset; they advocated for yet more ambitious reforms, while in reality 
the government continued implementing policies which made signifi-
cant change impossible (including ZIDRES, discussed in the previous 
section). Márquez also spoke out against the 2011 Victims’ and Land 
Restitution Law, passed soon before public negotiations began,10 as little 
more than a scheme to defraud campesinos, calling instead for a more 
profound territorial re-design which would challenge the overlay of a 
mining-energy extractivist matrix on agricultural space (BPP, 2018, Vol. 
2: 59–63). With the disruptions, conflicts and even massacres brought 
about by past experiences of prospective mining, fracking, mega-dam 
construction and large-scale agri-business projects, the FARC echoed 
scholarly work on the dangers of recasting maldevelopment as a 
pathway to sustainable peace (Montesinos Coleman, 2017). One nego-
tiator pointed out: “The agrarian reform…. they are proposing it in 
terms of titling vacant baldios, not from the point of view of latifundio” 
(Colectivo Viktoria, 2016). In other words, the provisions in the agree-
ment were ultimately not redistributive, as they involved “no trans-
ference from legal and private large estates to small landholders or 
property-less individuals” (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2019: 314). For the FARC, 
maintaining land concentration within a few hands would continue 
fostering violence, yet the Colombian government continued to redline 
these issues – alongside related topics including free trade and food 
sovereignty – as off-topic to negotiations (BPP, 2018, Vol. 2: 409–413), 
and repeatedly decried the FARC’s tendency to discuss issues extraneous 
to the agenda (Ibid: 73, 98; Jaramillo, 2015, 2017). 
While still pushing for change, FARC negotiators ultimately recog-
nized that some accommodation would be necessary: “If we’d taken 
power by armed means, we have a revolutionary agrarian program. 
Immediate liquidation of latifundios. Confiscation of land. Appropriate 
state land and distribute it for free ….… provided we succeeded through 
armed means. As we’re now in dialogue, the music changes, the dance 
changes” (Colectivo Viktoria, 2016). Thus, they shifted to a more 
pragmatic stance, speaking the language of sustainable economic 
development and a more equitable distribution of land benefits, as 
opposed to the land itself: “Colombia has a wide variety of natural re-
sources, with enormous potential and wealth. But these assets are not 
enjoyed by the majority of the population” (Ibid). Therefore, govern-
mental red lines notwithstanding, broadening the axis of contention 
from land maldistribution to territorial prosperity enabled a compro-
mise allowing both government and FARC negotiators to continue bar-
gaining in the implementation phase. 
3.2. Differentiated state presence and multiple territorialities of violence 
At least six million Colombians – or around 12% of the country’s 
population – live in areas with limited state presence (García Villegas 
et al., 2016: 17). Given the inadequacy of public services in these areas, 
and the associated narrative of ‘state absence’, it is little surprise that 
expansion of government institutions was widely regarded as central to 
post-conflict rural development (Junieles Acosta, 2017). During nego-
tiations Jaramillo (2014) echoed that narrative, asserting that “the big 
challenge” for peace was “how to build the institutions that are going to 
guarantee a long-lasting peace on the ground.” In this way, territorial 
peace for the state amounted to the payment of a “historical debt” to 
communities (BPP, 2018, Vol. 7: 521; González González et al., 2016). 
The FARC contested this view, drawing on their ideological foun-
dations and historical practices. In his book Ceasefire (Cese El Fuego), 
Jacobo Arenas - FARC’s primary political ideologue – describes the post- 
1945 national security doctrine which emerged in the Cold War era, 
beginning in the USA and emanating across Latin America. Under this 
doctrine, the world is imagined as “powers in constant battle”, wherein 
the state acts as “an organism that must defend itself, grow and expand: 
little more than, a tool for capitalist expansion” (Arenas, 1984: 51). 
Accordingly, even the state’s willingness to negotiate a peace deal was 
attributable to this underlying expansionist logic: “before, it didn’t 
matter that in the jungle, which is far from the cities, there was an in-
surgency resisting. Now it does, because they need these places to 
develop large mining projects, because it’s where the natural resources 
are” (Colectivo Viktoria, 2016). 
The FARC, a suspected internal enemy under national security, drew 
attention to the state’s complicity in local territorialities of violence, 
including the ongoing threat of paramilitary actors (BPP, 2018, Vol. 7: 
521; González et al., 2016). For their negotiators, the paramilitaries 
10 The 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley de Víctimas y Restitución 
de Tierras, Law 1448) covers a range of issues including land restitution. The 
Law provoked strong opposition both from sectors of society who feared it may 
jeopardize their control of lands seized illegally through human rights viola-
tions, and those seeking the return of lands they were forced to abandon (see 
Amnesty International, 2012). 
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were an expression of the same force of territorial domination: “…it’s 
not only the issue of guns, because that is the expression. They’re who 
goes and shoots, it’s true. But this has an economic, political, and social 
basis. Who gives the orders?” (FARC member, in Colectivo Viktoria, 
2016). This view to some degree reflects other challenges to the ‘state 
absence’ narrative, including Ballvé’s (2012) suggestion that modern 
liberal statehood is not in conflict with, but in fact co-constitutes, local 
economies of violence. Other Colombian scholars have evidenced that, 
rather than replacing the state, non-state actors (including guerrilla, 
religious, narcotrafficking, paramilitary organisations and landowners) 
establish a multiplicity of local governance arrangements, which may 
negotiate with or run parallel to the state (González et al., 2016; Garcia 
Villegas et al., 2016; González González, 2016). Working within the 
political geography canon influenced by Robert Sack and Claude Raf-
festein, Courtheyn (2019) refers to these multiple territorialities as a 
contested process whereby social actors and political subjects attempt to 
maintain a degree of autonomy in their space-exteriority relations, and 
thereby produce ‘other territorialities’ that resist the violences of armed 
actors. 
FARC negotiators further praised “patriotic resistance” to state- 
sponsored violence, citing semi-autonomous indigenous and Afro- 
Colombian communities in the Cauca, Quimbo and Caldas regions 
(BPP, 2018, Vol. 2: 63–64). Though the guerrilla insurgency had pur-
sued military expansion and the seizing of central power, their strategy 
had gradually shifted in the late 1980 s towards long-term territorial 
consolidation and the deconstruction of state power at the village and 
municipal level (Brittain, 2010: 155). Thus, drawing on their historical 
practices and a discourse emphasising local potentials beyond state ter-
ritorialities, the FARC sought to carve out a revived, newly legitimized 
space for themselves in post-agreement politics: “We will be an alter-
native and a new territorial power. … We will be a revolutionary party 
that represents a response to the needs of the population” (Marquez, 
cited in Resumen Latinoamericano, 2017). Yet, it was this emphasis on 
the unmet needs of peripheral regions which, despite the multiple 
competing narratives including ‘national security’, ‘historical debt’, 
‘abandonment’ and ‘absence’, ultimately served to unite FARC and the 
government on the urgency of expanding the public sphere – albeit 
contingent upon active local participation. 
3.3. The participatory process 
Participatory experiences in peace and development have a long and 
rich history of co-producing territorial diagnostics and initiatives with 
local communities in Colombia. Since the mid-1990s, these kinds of 
processes have taken place in numerous municipalities; a notable 
example is the ‘Peace Laboratories’ initiative in the Magdalena Medio 
region, which explicitly emphasised broad conceptions of peace, both 
‘designed for’ and ‘developed in’ local experience (Barreto Henriques, 
2009: 142)11. Jaramillo called for participation as key to (state) insti-
tutional strengthening and recognised that peace was “something we 
have to do with communities in the territories” (Jaramillo, 2015). Yet 
the governmental programme only drew partially (mostly discursively) 
from the robust knowledge systematized from participatory experiences 
by numerous NGOs, thinktanks and grassroots social organisations 
including the Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 
DeJusticia, and Fundación Ideas para la Paz. This was permeated by 
multiple other struggles made visible by the participatory forums 
included in peace negotiations. 
The FARC have consistently highlighted allegiance to Colombian 
people in opposition to state repression and latifundistas. They repeat-
edly reiterated that the peace process was to benefit “all Colombians”, 
not just their members (BPP, 2018, Vol. 2: 58–62). Moreover, even if 
agreeing with a differentiated peace for post-conflict territories built 
from within the regions (Cairo et al., 2018: 466), the FARC firmly 
emphasised the collective over the individual for land restitution and 
participatory governance. For their own members, they vehemently 
opposed being subjected to the standard disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration (DDR) approach (FARC-EP, 2017: 29), on the grounds 
that what they were doing was not demobilizing, but “mobilizing into 
open politics”, and called on their entire guerrilla, militia and urban 
clandestine structures to join the effort (Colectivo Viktoria, 2016). They 
also rejected the term reintegration, claiming that, in reality, they had 
never been separate from the country’s civilian community.12 
Co-sponsoring broad-based participation served to legitimise the 
peace process domestically and internationally. The Agrarian Develop-
ment Forum (ADF) in Bogota initiated a series of events held between 
2012 and 2014, where elements of rural reform would be discussed 
among 1314 representatives from 522 organisations, accompanied by 
national and international observers, cooperation agencies and the 
media (UN and UNC, 2012b: 13). The explicit objective was to input into 
a concerted model of rural development to inform the agreement. More 
broadly, however, the Forum outlined the complexities and intricacies 
of rural Colombia and a platform for voicing alternative conceptions of 
territorial peace. Representatives of the Asociación Nacional de Zonas de 
Reserva Campesina described the peace process as a unique opportunity 
to discuss and define rules of social justice with landowners, business-
men and bankers (Ibid: 86). Keynote speaker Darío Fajardo conveyed 
the attendees’ hopes and expectations, emphasising that urban quality 
of life depends on rural wellbeing (Ibid: 34). Thus, the Forum provided 
an opening for civil society organizations and grassroots collectives to 
inscribe practical experiences and theoretical lessons into broader un-
derstandings of territorial peace. 
Tellingly, the non-participation of certain factions revealed the ex-
istence of deep-seated ideological opposition to the process. In partic-
ular, the absence of the powerful National Federation of Cattle Farmers 
(FEDEGAN) foreshadowed later resistance to the peace process. As 
outlined in their letter rejecting the invitation to participate, FEDE-
GAN’s President Lafaurie stated they would never agree to negotiate 
rural development with the FARC, whom they blamed for decades of 
conflict and “destruction” (Ibid: Annex 8). FEDEGAN’s associates own 
one-third of national land, and their absence significantly weakened the 
Forum’s socio-political potential, arguably foretelling the opposition to 
the process which crystallized in the 2016 referendum and 2018 presi-
dential election. In response, FARC delegates accused FEDEGAN of 
concealing their true interest, protecting the untouchable latifundio 
behind an ideological façade (BPP, 2018, Vol. 2: 150). 
The participation that did occur informed FARC’s evolving under-
standing of territorial peace and subsequent policy proposals. In January 
2013, they issued Ten proposals for an integrated rural and agricultural 
land development policy (with territorial focus), which explicitly incorpo-
rated ideas from campesino, indigenous and Afro-Colombian commu-
nities involved in the Forum regarding decentralization, land access, 
autonomy, planning and political recognition (Ibid, Vol. 2: 195–201). 
While this revised agenda retains a clear emphasis on land, its explicit 
territorial focus implies a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional 
conception of territory as social and historical product. In this reading, 
territory comprises forms of production, consumption and exchange, 
and networks of institutions and organisational forms (UNDP, 2011: 31). 
In this sense, pluralistic dialogues informed FARC’s discursive shift from 
land to territory, as well as input into the final agreement on various 
issues pertaining to rural reform, political participation, victims’ rights 
and transitional justice. 
11 The community-lead peace zone at San José de Apartadó has been widely 
studied as exemplary of peacebuilding from below (Hancock, 2017; Courtheyn, 
2016). 
12 
“The FARC said to the government that they are not going to reintegrate 
into civilian life because they had never left the country” (interview with 
former reintegration worker, May 2019). 
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3.4. Alternative visions of territorial relationality 
At the Agrarian Development Forum and subsequent participatory 
events that took place both in Bogotá and numerous local territories, 
diverse collectives responded to Jaramillo’s (2014) call for an ‘act of 
imagination’, which paraphrased Lederach’s (2005) influential ‘moral 
imagination’ approach for moving past destructive cycles of violence. In 
doing so, they inscribed new meanings into territorial peace that chal-
lenged both the state-sponsored project of extractivist trans-
nationalisation and neoliberal tropes of peace and sustainable 
development underpinning it.13 These were predicated on buen vivir14 
(translated as good living or living well), collective life projects, and 
comprehensive rural development plans respecting diverse human- 
nature relations (UN and UNC, 2012a). Participants explored concepts 
such as autonomy and co-existence, echoing Escobar’s (2018: 181) work 
on pluriversal territorial designs, which draw on “dialogue with other 
people, albeit under conditions of greater epistemic and social 
equality”15. Proposals also intersected with gender perspectives on 
women’s role in agroecology and economy of care, food sovereignty, 
and, in the case of the Afro-Colombian roundtable, claims of ancestral 
territorial presence combined with el derecho a la cuidad (the right to the 
city), thereby linking urban and rural struggles through an appeal to 
collective territorial rights (Zeiderman, 2016; Asher and Ojeda, 2009). 
In this way, the Forums allowed for articulation of “an alternative ter-
ritorial order resisting the state’s intent to subject [communities] to a 
hegemonic idea of economic development” (Montoya, 2018: 475). 
Drawing together diverse interpretations, a group of organisations 
produced and presented a joint declaration at the ADF, which heralded 
peace negotiations as an opportunity to contest the agribusiness and 
extractivist “locomotives” of the hegemonic economic model. Rather 
than reversing previous threats of territorial violence, they argued that 
the model, based on export-oriented monocrops, oil and metals extrac-
ted from the land with high socio-environmental costs, exacerbates 
inequity, deepens the rural/urban divide, and fuels structural forms of 
conflict, including violent appropriation of land and mass displacement 
(UN and UNC, 2012b: 67). Their analysis speaks closely to Escobar’s 
(2018: 68) notion of a “sociology of absences”, whereby diverse forms of 
life are rendered invisible and then threatened with complete or onto-
logical occupation. Still, the declaration concluded, peace had the po-
tential to facilitate alternative income opportunities beyond traditional 
services such as trade and transport, including ecological, rural and 
adventure tourism, environmental services and other forms of non- 
agricultural work (UN and UNC, 2012b: 74-76). For some, the mere 
acknowledgement of these alternatives was a notable step forward: Fa-
ther Francisco de Roux, President of Colombia’s Truth Commission, 
affirmed that “what Colombia is doing is discussing the [development] 
model although it has been said that it can’t be discussed, that it is not 
negotiable. What this forum has made clear is that WE DO NOT HAVE 
TO KILL EACH OTHER to discuss this model” (Ibid: 111, emphasis in 
original). 
The ideas and visions expressed by civil society participants at the 
ADF resonated with the FARC’s long-standing agrarian policy, which 
recognises alternative forms of peasant landholding, and demands col-
lective forms of land tenure. Indeed, as a highly territorial organisation 
with many of its members historically drawn from indigenous and 
campesino communities, the FARC shares certain characteristics with 
ontological struggles (Atuesta, 2019). In further testament to this, leader 
Jesús Santrich even explicitly referenced buen vivir as core to the orga-
nization’s understanding of territorial peace (Cairo, 2018: 468). 
Furthermore, the consideration of multiple ontological perspectives 
suited the FARC’s aim to achieve the “maximum number of changes 
possible” through negotiations (Colectivo Viktoria, 2016). While unde-
niably strict, even harsh enforcers of their own forms of governance in 
territories under their influence (Arjona, 2016), FARC had long 
emphasised education and debate both within their own ranks and 
among civilian communities. For Arenas (1984: 47), it was “the essential 
task of the revolutionary parties… to arrive with new ideas to the minds 
of the working class and the people, so that people …become aware of 
the need for change”. Indeed, there is further evidence of engagement 
with scholars, journalists, civilians and researchers on a range of issues 
including peace, agrarian issues and international humanitarian law 
while the conflict was still ongoing (Brittain 2010: 178). Thus - in words 
closely echoing those of Father Francisco - FARC were ultimately “… 
trying to create the minimum conditions of [being able to say] ’come on, 
I think like this, don’t kill me… I want to build a country like this, let’s 
not shoot each other, let’s not kill each other.’ … That’s what we want to 
achieve with this peace agreement” (Colectivo Viktoria, 2016). 
Importantly, not all organisations at the Agrarian Forum supported 
radical takes on territorial peace. The National Agricultural Association 
of Colombia (Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia, SAC) saluted gov-
ernment refusal to discuss the economic model, especially concerning 
guarantees to private property and a market economy production 
framework (UN and UNC, 2012b: 45). SAC welcomed social investment 
and infrastructure plans to close the gap between rural and urban areas 
but urged the government to reverse plans for Family Agricultural Units 
(UAF)16, which, they argued, constrained large-scale agribusiness 
development. This seemed to be more aligned with the government’s 
own stance: with factions inside the Santos administration envisioning 
territorial peace as no more than the pacification of post-conflict terri-
tories via strengthening state control, there was no room for alternative 
provisions to their incorporation of the extractivist economic model 
(Cairo and Rios, 2019). The FARC too recognised this; in later criticism 
they described the government’s stance on the agreement as “simply as 
the disarmament of the FARC, the possibility of increasing economic 
growth […] and arriving with investments in territories that had not 
previously been reached due to the guerrilla presence” (FARC-EP, 2017: 
24). The next section further distinguishes between territorial peace as a 
policy discourse reshaped by social actors and its thus far fragmented 
and limited implementation, before we turn to the policy and theoretical 
lessons that territorial peace offers. 
4. Fraught implementation, continuing struggle 
The peace agreement included numerous mechanisms for securing 
an end to armed conflict and long-term peace (altogether 578 pro-
visions). Among these, Territorially Focused Development Programmes 
(Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial – PDETs) were to play a 
preeminent role in comprehensive rural reform. This section argues that 
13 Even more benign forms of this pervasive view on globalization-dependent 
prosperity – what Escobar (2016: 15) calls the One-World world – encouraged 
campesinos to shift from traditional agroforestry forms of relational world- 
making to market-oriented agro-industrial monoculturevas intended to secure 
long-term income. See Lederach’s (2017) insightful example from the Montes 
de María highlands.  
14 The sumak kawsay or buen vivir paradigm, which foregrounds human- 
nature relations, has been highly influential within indigenist, socialist and 
post-structuralist approaches to socio-environmental sustainability in Latin 
America in the early twenty-first century (Vanhulst, 2015).  
15 The concept of relational world making is key to understanding pluriversal 
claims and the territorial resistances of which they are part. Regarding long- 
standing indigenous demands over their territories, Caro (in Ulloa and Coro-
nado, 2016: 38) argues that collective retribution can only be successful if 
designed around the notion of ‘territory-environment’ as a continuum for 
indigenous life, whereby land rights are supplemented with holistic consider-
ations for what lies underground and what lives on the ground. 
16 The UAF represents “the amount of land considered necessary for a family 
to obtain a decent livelihood … the maximum the state may award to a single 
person” (Oxfam, 2019: 3); in other words, it is essentially an attempt to impose 
limits on land concentration. 
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the scheme is failing to meet its transformative potential. PDETs have 
been unable to integrate bottom-up territorial visions into state- 
sponsored regional development and implementation has been vulner-
able to delay, obfuscation and re-orientation. Bureaucratic and logistical 
challenges compound the underlying ontological threats to post- 
agreement territories. These have intensified since the 2018 change in 
national government – a shift which to some degree represents a polit-
ical backlash against the reforms themselves (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2019) 
and induced further deviation from PDETs as stipulated in the agree-
ment. For their part, the FARC have experienced fragmentation amidst 
ongoing political violence. Social protest has resurged, culminating in 
the unprecedented Paro Nacional (national strike) of 2019–20, which 
not only expressed disapproval of Duque’s policies but also manifested 
discontent over the initial yields of territorial peace and historical 
grievances across Colombia’s regions. 
4.1. Territorially Focused Development Programmes (PDETs) 
Designed to spearhead rural reform, PDETs involve 16 specially 
designated sub-regions encompassing 170 municipalities. These 
constitute peripheral areas of the country which have been most affected 
by conflict, illicit economies, poverty and institutional weakness 
(Fig. 1).17 PDETs were to operate through a consistent, sequential and 
multi-scalar participatory process. Beginning with each vereda (the 
smallest administrative division), the diagnostic phase would centre on 
pre-defined thematic pillars including land use, infrastructure, economic 
development and social services, which would support the construction 
of a collective “territorial vision” (CEPDIPO, 2020: 3). In turn, these 
dialogues would inform municipal- and sub-regional level discussions, 
aggregating into distinct Action Plans for Regional Transformation 
(Planes de Acción para la Transformación Regional, PATR) for each of the 
sub-regions. With a 10-year time frame, PATRs would be delivered 
through $79 billion pesos of funding, equating to 60% of the entire 
peace budget. Gutiérrez Sanín (2019) praises these provisions, 
describing them as “sensible and progressive”. For Phelan (2018: 845), 
they represent the direct realization of territorial peace as an inclusive, 
democratic process. 
Limits and challenges initially emerged under Santos. Firstly, the 
pre-defined thematic pillars narrowed the realm of dialogue and were 
disconnected from communities’ historical experiences (CEPDIPO, 
2020: 5). Staff from the newly-created Agency for Territorial Renovation 
(Agencia de Renovación del Territorio, ART), the unit responsible for 
administering the PDETs, lacked information on former local state-led 
initiatives, many of which had failed to achieve desired changes. This 
fomented mistrust and participation fatigue: one researcher decried 
“communities are tired of being asked what their problems are, which 
have been the same for years” (Ramos, 2019). Further implementation 
was subject to significant delays - indeed, rural reform continues to lag 
behind other agreement provisions, and even with the ART including 
‘PDET works’ (‘Obras PDET’) as an indicator of progress, these small, 
rapid infrastructure improvements do not contribute to longer-term 
transformation (CEPDIPO, 2020: 11). Furthermore, despite the PDETs’ 
impressive funding figure, more than half of their $79 billion peso 
budget is sourced from central government funding constitutionally 
allocated to municipalities for core services like education, health and 
basic sanitation, thus prohibiting the possibility of re-directing resources 
to align with transformative territorial visions (Ibid: 10). 
President Duque’s stance towards PDETs is still further removed 
from the agreement’s vision. Implementation has come to centre on the 
delivery of piecemeal projects. Characterised as a “policy of simulation” 
(CEPDIPO, 2020), the PDET scheme has departed from the recom-
mended comprehensive process of collective construction (Kroc Insti-
tute, 2018: 25). The vereda dialogues resulted in over 32,000 separate 
requests, with many constituting pre-existing local needs underserviced 
by the state, and have not been effectively cohered, scaled up into 
regional and national initiatives, or integrated with other rural reform 
instruments (CEPDIPO, 2020: 5). Moreover, the new High Commis-
sioner for Peace Miguel Ceballos established five Strategic Zones for 
Comprehensive Intervention (Zonas Estratégicas de Intervención Integral, 
ZEII), encompassing 44 municipalities, with the aim of improving na-
tional security through the “micro-focalisation of military and police 
plans” (DNP, 2019: 20). While the government claims that ZEIIs have no 
bearing on PDET implementation (Forero, 2019), analysis suggests 
PDETs’ diminishment as planning instruments and the overlaying of a 
pacification logic backed by state security forces (CEPDIPO, 2020: 7-8). 
In fact, peace funds risk being diverted for ZEIIs and other political uses 
instead of advancing the PDET programmes (Parada Diaz, 2019). While 
this re-orientation echoes Uribe’s ‘Democratic Security’ approach 
(Jerez, 2019), it also points to a deeper issue: the historically entrenched 
complexity of Colombian bureaucracy, whereby conflicts over land are 
de-emphasised and de-politicized through the creation of ever more 
complex territorial designations and decision-making procedures (Cas-
tillejo-Cuelar, 2019; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2019: 328). 
4.2. Undoing territorial peace 
The slackened and reoriented PDET implementation which has 
occurred under Duque has fuelled misgivings over the future of terri-
torial peace (CINEP, 2018: 37-8). Adhering to the “peace with legality” 
rebranding, the High Commissioner for Peace was tasked with managing 
the FARC’s “demobilization, disarmament and reinsertion…upon which 
true peace can be consolidated” (Duque, 2018), despite the FARC’s 
explicit rejection of these terms. While the continued threat of armed 
actors, including FARC dissidents, allegedly justifies this resignification, 
the criminalisation of protest serves to re-frame socio-environmental 
conflicts as security issues (through legislation first introduced under 
Santos), and territorial peace becomes territorial pacification (Olarte- 
Olarte, 2019). Furthermore, this confirms Zibechi’s (2016: 184) pre-
diction of a pervasive, ‘capillary militarization’ whereby non-ideological 
armed actors for hire continue vying for territorial control in areas 
suitable for coca production or with mining potential, including many 
PDET municipalities. A recent report from the UN Human Rights Com-
mission identifies cases of collusion between security forces and illegal 
armed groups (Relief Web, 2020). Implications are grave: in 2019 alone 
over 50,000 people were displaced (Fundación Ideas Para La Paz, 2019). 
For their part, the FARC accuse the government of delays and re- 
orientation of peace, and responsibility over ongoing assassination of 
social leaders and ex-combatants. Leaders have also challenged inter-
national monitors, rejecting the Kroc Institute’s (2020) assertion that 
40% of the agreement’s provisions have been implemented or are on 
their way to being fully implemented (Partido FARC, 2020). However, 
disillusionment with both the process and leadership has driven internal 
fragmentation, particularly exacerbated by Marquez’s call for rearma-
ment. Poor election results through 2018 and 2019 have not helped. 
Moreover, most ex-combatants have dispersed from transition camps. 
Whereas these spaces are becoming permanent sites for collective 
reincorporation, and all but one can be found in PDET municipalities, as 
of January 2020 just 54% of ex-combatants remained in all PDET areas 
(ARN, 2020). A minority have joined dissident or other illegal armed 
groups, and though most are engaging with the reincorporation process, 
many have severed ties with the party structure. This disintegration 
furthers the unravelling of territorial peace, especially promises of 
facilitating a legitimate role for FARC in politics. 
Post-agreement delays and continuing violence have, somewhat 
17 Though most PDET municipalities (68%) are located within departments 
where the Yes vote prevailed in the national referendum, the ballot exhibited 
complex patterns and cleavages across Colombia’s regions. Those patterns 
require close analysis, and are not fully explained by the well-known account 
that remote areas subject to ongoing violence supported the process, while the 
No vote in core regions led to an overall narrow defeat for Santos. 
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paradoxically, served to unite Colombians across myriad territories. This 
came to the fore in November 2019, when a planned one-day national 
strike against labour reforms transformed into weeks of mobilization. 
While undeniably motivated by widespread disapproval of Duque’s 
administration, including its stance towards peace, the Paro is best un-
derstood in the context of historical, local and regional-level mobiliza-
tions and the accumulation of unresolved demands. Protestors called not 
only for improvement to core public services and human rights gua-
rantees, but also for structural socio-economic change including what 
we interpret as ending the ontological occupation of territories. The 
Paro, colourfully characterised as a “referendum” on Duque, included 
widespread participation of student, indigenous, labour, political and 
social groups (Janetsky, 2019). One poll showed public support of 74% 
(Semana, 2019), a figure notably higher than the 2016 peace referen-
dum ‘Yes’ vote (49.8%). More notable still, protests were not limited to 
peripheral or conflict-affected regions, predicted to experience a spike in 
protests (see CINEP, 2016: 14), but included urban territories with a 
‘No’-voting majority. It may be, then, that the failures of territorial peace 
have done more to rally Colombians than its unrealistic promises. 
5. Concluding remarks: lessons from Colombia 
Colombia’s peace agreement is no longer hailed as the exemplary 
model of success it once was. International monitors at the Kroc Institute 
now offer comparisons to fraught peace processes including in Lebanon, 
Nepal, Angola, Tajikistan, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and the Ivory Coast, 
and the latest report warns of the “risk of compromising the achieve-
ments made by not taking advantage of the full potential for trans-
formation” (Kroc Institute, 2020: 5). By way of conclusion we consider, 
firstly, the extent to which territorial peace ever encompassed genuine 
transformative potential and, secondly, what other lessons for peace 
research geographers extricate from its construction and 
implementation. 
The territorial peace agenda, for all its ambiguities and limitations, 
allowed institutional, insurgent and people’s voices to co-construct a 
common vision committed to overcoming the longest armed conflict in 
modern history. Amidst scepticism and political polarization, the focus 
on local territories “generated an atmosphere of hope” inducing bottom- 
up, participatory engagement (Le Billon et al., 2020: 305). For the 
Santos government, it justified focusing on state consolidation and 
economic growth in peripheral areas; it brought and kept FARC nego-
tiators at the table while curtailing their “maximalist ambitions” for 
national transformation (BPP, Vol. 1: 216; 220); and it garnered inter-
national acclaim while securing the necessary domestic support to 
rescue the agreement after the referendum reversal. For the FARC, ter-
ritory resonated with their historical agrarian agenda while allowing 
them to articulate an oppositional discourse on the conflict’s founda-
tions; carve out a legitimized role in local and national politics, and 
present themselves as allies of Colombian society in opposition to state- 
sponsored development projects and (para-)state territorialities of 
violence. For grassroots organisations of diverse collectives representing 
long-suffering rural areas, it offered hope for material change through 
more equitable land and resource distribution, infrastructural invest-
ment and democratic participation, and a secure space to propose al-
ternatives to development. This act of peaceful “geographical 
imagination” (Peña, 2019) simultaneously claimed recognition for plu-
riversal territorialities and forms of life seeking co-existence with an 
expanding mode of extractivist development rife with new-and-old 
Fig. 1. Map depicting PDET municipalities overlaid on departments classified by 2016 referendum results. Source: Map produced by Dr. Eloy Montes Galbán for 
authors’ use based on data from the ART - available online at https://www.renovacionterritorio.gov.co/Publicaciones/municipios_pdet_subregiones. 
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violences. Therefore, rather than a weakness, the polysemic character of 
territorial peace (Cairo et al., 2018: 466-67) allowed, or even spear-
headed, inclusive dialogues regarding what an end to conflict could 
mean as a first step to building peaceful futures. 
Implementation disappointments illustrate the impossibility of 
focalised peace programmes becoming transformational, or even sus-
tainable, if unaccompanied by broader political economy shifts (Duf-
field, 2005; Cooper et al., 2011). With unaltered power relations, the 
peace discourse recast economic development as indispensable to 
ending conflict, instead of one of the factors historically fuelling it 
(Montesinos Coleman, 2017). The notion of pacification through 
strengthened institutions veiled the structural violence of differentiated 
state presence and did little in practice to curb new forms of intimidation 
and assassination of defenders of campesino, indigenous and Afro- 
Colombian territories. After the electoral backlash, in which 
entrenched political-economic interests and societal resentment towards 
FARC played no minor roles, President Duque’s resignification of peace 
‘with legality’ furthered the criminalisation of social protest in rural 
areas (Olarte-Olarte, 2019) and diluted the transformative potential of 
development plans, overlaying them with security-enhancement zones. 
The broader problem of overlapping jurisdictions and fragmentary re-
mits discussed in the paper forewarns against the unheeded reification of 
‘local’ territory, as well as the dangers of failing to integrate policies and 
analyses across scales. 
The important roles that resilient indigenous, Afro-Colombian and 
campesino communities played in the territorial-dialogical participatory 
construction of the peace programme confirm that peace is an inherently 
plural, socio-spatial phenomenon (Koopman, 2019: 209). Moreover, as 
our analysis of the genesis, evolution and implementation of territorial 
peace demonstrates, peace encompasses a realm wherein political 
legitimacy is sought and contested (Megoran, et al., 2014: 211), and 
pluralistic collectives may be able to re-claim and re-signify its meanings 
and practices in direct challenge to ‘liberal peace’ agendas (Hammett 
and Marshall, 2017: 130). Mobilized actors were able to insert territorial 
well-being and buen vivir provisions in the peace agreement. These 
provisions indicate a counter-hegemonic ability to re-inscribe an 
inherently Western-centric policy document with culturally specific 
collective ways of being in the territory, such as those captured in Fals 
Borda’s (2009) earlier work on people’s thinking, feeling and desires in 
the Caribe region. As we have shown, the opening of peace occurs both 
within and beyond the bounds of formal participatory mechanisms, as 
reflected in the ongoing contentious actions spurred by fraught imple-
mentation of the agreement. We have mentioned that FARC 
ex-combatants pursue individual livelihoods beyond collective reincor-
poration spaces, beyond PDETs, and beyond the realm of electoral pol-
itics. Further research is required to examine how they will continue 
shaping peace following the notion of peace construction in the 
‘everyday’, where multiple social actors’ agency is unmistakable and 
consequential (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond, 2009; Williams, 2015). 
As a final lesson, Colombia’s territorial peace showcases the 
analytical value of territory for uncovering a more expansive, multi- 
dimensional understanding of peace and conflict through geography, 
which responds to calls from within and beyond the discipline 
(Kobayashi, 2009; Björkdahl, and Kappler, 2017). The geographies of 
(post)conflict are being thoroughly examined from various perspectives 
internationally. For example, Purdeková’s (2017) examination of 
‘ontopolitics’ in Burundi engages with struggles over the terms and 
practices employed to restructure both the physical and discursive space 
of post-conflict regions. As part of these debates, Latin American 
socio-territorial analysis provides insights on how territory may 
constitute “a key to conflict and a key to peace” (Vasquez and Valeriano, 
2009: 205). Thus, we argue, territory merits inclusion alongside space, 
place, scale and network as a core concept in the burgeoning critical 
geographies of peace literature (Williams et al., 2014). 
Our crtique of the territorial peace framework draws on multiple 
strands of Latin American perspectives on territory, all of which have 
implications for the geographies of peace and conflict. The Colombian 
government’s effort to ’bring peace to the territory’ reflects the fact that 
territory has emerged as a core political cleavage, over and above class 
or ideology (Rossi, 2019). The scheme’s shortcomings point to the 
state’s failure to understand forms of multiple and overlapping territo-
rialities (Agnew and Oslender, 2013; Haesbaert, 2013), or to account for 
the ways in which (para)state actors continue to be entangled in violent 
regimes of differentiated governing (Ballvé, 2012; Garcia Villegas et al., 
2016). Emphasising territory, and particularly state efforts towards 
’territorial redesign’ brings to the fore the socio-ecological disruptions 
induced by neoliberal economic policies in Latin America and beyond 
(Kanai, 2016). Pacification efforts by the Colombian state can be un-
derstood as a localised form of “actually existing neoliberalism” within a 
broader, variegated process of geo-political economy transformation 
(Peck and Theodore, 2012). The focus on peripheral post-conflict ter-
ritories constitutes an example of infrastructure-led development, 
resulting in a scramble of investments in peripheral regions of the global 
South (Kanai and Schindler, 2018; Schindler and Kanai, 2019). Finally, 
resistances to territorial peace point to pluriversal geographies and 
struggles against the ontological occupation of life and difference 
(Escobar, 2018). Our examination of proposed alternatives during ne-
gotiations and post-agreement protests should inspire future studies to 
engage more deeply with local epistemologies and indigenous/tradi-
tional ontologies, whilist theorising and supporting diverse repertoires 
of mobilization across marginalizaed spaces. 
The story of territorial peace continues. Despite announcing a 
“conversation” to hear the demands of protestors, the government’s 
initial response to the Paro Nacional left hundreds injured and at least 
three dead in the first day alone. The subsequent Covid-19 pandemic has 
raised further doubts about the future of the agreement and of peace on 
the ground. At this critical juncture, it is crucial that further research is 
conducted to map out ongoing reverberations of the territorial peace 
construct, particularly in communities where the agreement’s promises 
most raised expectations for change. Further inquiry along the retro-
spective and prospective dimensions deployed herein could provide a 
solid basis for peace research in diverse contexts, including and in 
juxtaposition with the Colombian case. Peace is “not the same every-
where” (Koopman, 2011: 194): nor should it be, and open dialogues on 
its – territorial – causes and solutions may yet contribute to imagining 
and realising the kind(s) of peace that people truly want. 
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Björkdahl,, A., Kappler, S., 2017. Peacebuilding and Spatial Transformation: Peace, Space 
and Place. Routledge, London, [England]; New York.  
Brauchler, B., Naucke, P., 2017. Peacebuilding and conceptualisations of the local. Social 
Anthropol. 25 (4), 422–1236. https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-8676.12454. 
Brittain, J., 2010. Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia: The Origin and Direction of 
the FARC-EP. Pluto Press. 
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FARC-EP, 1964. Programa Agrario de los Guerrilleros de las FARC-EP. [online]. [Viewed 
6 August 2020]. Available from: https://www.farc-ep.co/octava-conferencia/pr 
ograma-agrario-de-los-guerrilleros-de-las-farc-ep.html. 
FARC-EP, 2017. Documento de trabajo, marzo. Tesis preparatorias del congreso 
fundacional del partido de las FARC-EP. [online] [Viewed 6 August 2020]. Available 
from: http://www.cedema.org/uploads/FARC_TesisAbril.pdf. 
Forero, S., 2019. ¿Cuál es la importancia de los Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque 
Territorial (PDET)? El Espectador [online]. Updated 2 Mar 2019, 13:00. [Viewed 6 
August 2020]. Available from: https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/terr 
itorio/cual-es-la-importancia-de-los-programas-de-desarrollo-con-enfoque-territor 
ial-pdet-articulo-857704/. 
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